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IN THE APPEALS COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE ZIMMERMAN 
Applicant 
Petitioner 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
GRANITE BEEF, INC. and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH and 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
Defendants 
Respondents 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STEVE ZIMMERMAN through his legal counsel, BRUCE WILSON, 
certifies that this petition for rehearing is not made for 
purposes of delay, but is based on belief that errors have 
occurred or points have been overlooked and that rehearing or 
reconsideration of these points is needed to avoid injustice and 
to clarify the law as decided in this case. 
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ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 
1. The first Issue Is WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING IN 
STREATOR CHEVROLET RESTRICTS THE STATUTORY WORD "INCAPACITY" TO A 
NARROWER, INCLUDED MEANING OF "IMPAIRMENT" OR WHETHER THE COURT 
MERELY SUBSTITUTED "IMPAIRMENT" IN PLACE OF THE STATUTORY WORD 
"INCAPACITY" BECAUSE IT CONVENIENTLY APPLIED TO THE FACTS IN THAT 
CASE. 
On page six of Its opinion, this Court Indicated that the 
Supreme Court has found that the term "aggravation," as used In 
section 35-1-69(1) requires industrially caused "Impairment" as 
pre-condition for receiving compensation and, for support of this 
rule, cites Second Injury Fund v Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 
1176, 1181 (Utah 1985). 
The Court fails to address the question or account for the 
fact that the statute mandates compensation if an "Incapacity" 
caused by industrial Injury aggravates or is aggravated by a pre-
existing "incapacity." 
It is axiomatic that Utah law distinguishes "impairment" of 
bodily function from "disability" to perform occupational duties. 
In Section 35-1-69(1) the Legislature used the word "incapacity," 
a more general term that by common definition encompasses both 
impairment and disability. 
Finding that the holding of the Supreme Court in Streator 
Chevrolet restricts the statutory word "incapacity" to the narrow 
meaning of "impairment" is not justified. The Streator Court 
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acknowledges ambiguity in the statute relating to the require-
ments of the "aggravation" language, but it declines to address 
that issue because in the Streator case there was substantial 
industrial impairment. Consequently, it would have made no 
difference in Streator whether "incapacity" was limited to 
"impairment1 or read broadly to include "disability" as well. 
Thus, in stating its holding, the Court substituted the word 
"impairment" in place of the statutory "incapacity." There is no 
indication that in maklnu that, substitution they intended to 
exclude the concept of "disability" from the statutory meaning of 
"incapacity,ff There was no discussion on that issue, and that 
issue was n>t before the Court. The words "incapacity" and 
"impairment" were used Interchangeably throughout the Streator 
Chevrolet opinion. The use of "impairment" as a requirement in 
the holding of Streator Chevrolet appears to be a consequence of 
the fact that impairment was in issue in that case. It does not 
manifest any intent by the Supreme Cour t to interpret the 
statutory language so as to limit the clear meaning of the word 
"incapacity" in a way that would preclude "disability" as an 
appropriate alternative mean i ng o f t he wor d " I neapac i fy " 
Consequently, the holding of Streator Chevrolet should be 
read 
"If the industrial injury results in a permanent 
incapacity that is aggravated by or aggravates a pre-
existing incapacity, then compensation shall be awarded..." 
That statement of the holding follows the statutory language 
more closely, and nothing in Streator indicates an intent to do 
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other than follow the plain meaning of that language. 
Thus, as applied to Mr. Zimmerman, the Streator Chevrolet 
interpretation of the statute says 
"If the Industrial injury results in incapacity 
(disability) which aggravates (increases or adds to) a pre-
existing incapacity (20% impairment), then compensation ... 
shall be awarded..." 
2. The second issue is WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL, OR REASON-
ABLY FOUNDED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
FINDING THAT MR. ZIMMERMAN'S INABILITY TO RETURN TO HIS FORMER 
OCCUPATION WAS CAUSED BY HIS PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS." (Medical 
Panel finding #2) 
While it may be decided that the aggravation referred to by 
the medical panel was that due solely to temporary pain, that is 
not the only aggravation in question. 
It is undisputed fact adopted by the ALJ and Industrial 
Commission that Mr. Zimmerman worked six years without complaint 
despite his pre-existing impairment. It is further agreed by 
virtually every examining doctor, including the medical panel, 
that Mr. Zimmerman is now medically incapable of continuing his 
former occupation. (For references in the Record, see p. 3 #1 
and p. 4 #6 of Appellant's Brief.) 
To say that Mr. Zimmerman's disability is caused by his pre-
existing conditions cannot stand up to rational scrutiny, since 
it is undisputed that he worked six years without complaint with 
the 20% impairment and only became disabled following the 
industrial injury. 
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This court has the power to affirm findings of the 
Commission only if they are "supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the who] e record before the court." Grace 
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 67. 
IN SUMMARY: If the rule in Streator Chevrolet says t .he ii ldus-
trlal Injury must result in an "impairment," Mr. Zimmerman has no 
claim for aggravation. But if the statutory word Hincapacity'1 is 
the operative word thei i Mr. Zimmerman's inability to continue 
his former occupation constitutes an aggravation of his pre-
existing impairment, and he is entitled to benefits. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Zimmerman prays for reconsideration and reversal. 
He requests the following findings: 
1. That the only reasonable conclusion supported by the 
uncontradicted evidence is that, as a result of the industrial 
injury, Mr. Zimmerman is incapable of" returning to his tonner 
occupation. 
2. That he met the statutory requirements for compensation 
in that his industrial ly caused Incapacity aggravated his pre-
existing impairments. 
3. That he is consequently eligible, under the odd lot 
doctrine, for rehabilitation evaluat ioi i, ha^ < ing met the requi re-
ment of showing he cannot perform the duties of his former 
occupation. 
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£fk Dated this t>!H day of December, 1989. 
BRUCE J- WILSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on or by December 5, 1989, a copy of the 
attached PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed, postage paid, or 
hand delivered by me to the following: 
Richard Sumsion, Attorney, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
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Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Employer's Reinsurance Fund, 160 
East 300 South, P.O. Box 45580, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
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Bruce Wilson 
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